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Testing innovation, employment and distributional impacts of climate 
policy packages in a macro-evolutionary systems setting 
 
 
Abstract 
Climate policy has been mainly studied with economic models that assume representative, 
rational agents. However, it aims at changing behavior associated with carbon-intensive goods 
that are often subject to bounded rationality and social preferences, such as status and 
imitation. Here we use a macroeconomic multi-agent model with such features to test the 
effect of various policies on both environmental and economic performance. The model is 
particularly suitable to address distributional impacts of climate policies, not only because 
populations of many agents are included, but also as these are composed of different classes 
of households driven by specific motivations. We simulate various policy scenarios, combining 
in different ways a carbon tax, a reduction of labor taxes, subsidies for green innovation, a 
price subsidy to consumers for less carbon-intensive products, and green government 
procurement. The results show pronounced differences with those obtained by rational-agent 
model studies. It turns out that demand-oriented subsidies lead to lower unemployment and 
higher output, but perform less well in terms of carbon emissions. The supply-oriented subsidy 
for green innovation results in a significant reduction of carbon emissions with a slight 
reduction of unemployment. 
 
 
Keywords:  Agent based modelling; climate change; bounded rationality; carbon productivity; 
environmental innovation; double dividend; other-regarding preferences. 
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1. Introduction 
There is serious evidence that climate change is happening. Scientific research shows that now 
it is considered with more than 95% that human influence has been the dominant cause of the 
observed warming since the mid-20th century (IPCC, 2014). This underlines the need for 
developing and implementing climate policies. 
The study and testing of such policies so far is predominantly executed using models that 
assume representative, rational economic agents. It is nevertheless widely accepted now that 
this is not an accurate approximation of reality. It is better described by heterogeneous agents, 
which are moreover showing behavior in line with bounded rationality and other-regarding 
preferences. Such types of behavior become even more important when people are 
stimulated, as by climate policies, to drastically change their decisions and even life styles, and 
facing societal changes surrounded by much uncertainty as is the case of a transition to a low-
carbon economy (Grin et al., 2010; Safarzynska et al., 2012). Indeed, climate policy aims at a 
change in behavior associated often with the consumption of carbon-intensive goods that may 
be subject to bounded rationality and social preferences, such as status, imitation and even 
snob effects (Gowdy, 2008; Brekke and Johansson-Stenman, 2008; Gsottbauer and van den 
Bergh, 2010). 
Here we offer a first study of climate policy that uses a macroeconomic multi-agent model 
(ABM) of an artificial one-country economy that accounts for different types of boundedly 
rational and other-regarding behaviors of agents (households, firms, banks, governments) in a 
macroeconomic systems setting (Rengs and Wäckerle, 2014). The model belongs to a very 
small set of agent-based models in macroeconomics and political economy, which respond to a 
call in economics to give more attention to heterogeneity and complexity in financial- and 
macroeconomics (LeBaron and Tesfatsion, 2008; Farmer and Foley, 2009; Delli Gatti et al., 
2010; Stiglitz and Gallegati, 2011). Households consume subsistence goods (serving basic 
“needs”) and additional, luxury goods (serving additional “wants”), depending on their class 
and budget. The consumption of the first is necessary, while behavior anomalies such as status 
and imitation, associated with specific consumer classes (“poor workers”, “rich workers” and 
“capitalists”) motivate people’s consumption of the luxury goods. Status or snob effects make 
firm owners and upper class members to switch the consumption of extra goods and search 
for new firms, thus forming an important factor of economic innovation.  
Firms decide to innovate on the basis of how well they performed in the last period. Two types 
of innovation are included in the model: green innovation, which may be subsidized by 
governments, and labor productivity innovation. The environmental extension of the general 
macro-evolutionary model further involves the specification of CO2 emissions by firms. The 
carbon intensity (emissions per output in our model) of a firm can be reduced through green 
innovation. Banks provide loans to firms for investing in R&D, while the government decides 
about a policy package that comprises various types of taxes, including possibly a carbon tax, 
consumer price discounts, and subsidies on technological innovation or investment in green 
procurement.  
We use the resulting ABM and its environmental extension to test different climate policies in 
terms of their impacts on a range of relevant environmental, economic and welfare indicators. 
Next to a business-as-usual (BAU - no policy) scenario, we undertake a further simulation by 
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introducing a carbon tax, the revenues of which go to a “Carbon Fund”. Based on using this 
fund, six different climate policy packages are formulated and examined. This allows us, among 
others, to test the effect of an environmental tax on (un)employment, and address in a new, 
innovative way the well-known “double dividend” (realizing environment and employment 
goals) of environmental tax revision (e.g., Fullerton and Metcalf, 1997; de Mooij, 1999). This 
debate has been largely waged over general equilibrium effects without explicitly taking into 
account innovation impacts, consumer dynamics and income/wealth distributions. Here we re-
examine its rather skeptical conclusions (a double dividend is unlikely) if the tax revision does 
two things: on the one hand it shifts the incentives for firms to innovate in improvements in 
carbon rather than in labor productivity; and on the other hand it shifts consumption by 
households to less carbon-intensive products. The question is how different the findings with 
traditional economic model studies are in terms of reduction of carbon dioxide emissions. 
A first climate policy package (CPP) uses revenues from the carbon fund to subsidize green 
innovation. The second CPP considers a tax shift from labor to carbon, which essentially means 
using the carbon fund to reduce labor taxes. The third CPP examines the effects of a direct 
consumer price discount subsidized by the carbon fund to stimulate diffusion of green 
products. As a fourth CPP, we consider a carbon tax with revenues spent on green 
procurement. Finally, we conduct simulation experiments with various mixes of these climate 
policies. 
We will investigate these policy packages in terms of environmental, economic and welfare 
performance. Environmental performance will focus on the time patterns of carbon intensity 
of production and CO2 emissions and cumulative CO2 emissions (a measure of global warming). 
Economic indicators include unemployment, average income and income distribution, 
demographic indicators of firms, and how these correlate with environmental performance. 
We will further consider a few social welfare functions to analyze broader conceptions of 
social welfare that combine some of these indicators (Botzen and van den Bergh, 2014). In 
addition, we will be able to compare whether climate sustainability can be made consistent 
with steady economic growth (average income increases). This issue is fundamental to the 
debate on green growth, which has not devoted much attention to climate constraints, and 
certainly not from the angle of macroeconomic multi-agent systems accounting for behavioral 
anomalies. In this context, the productivity trap is relevant: higher labor productivity due to 
innovation results in more unemployment which is compensated by more demand due to 
higher wages; but higher wages stimulate further labor productivity rises (Jackson and Victor, 
2011). We can study this in relation to the policy involving a shift of taxes from labor to carbon. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the basic ABM, 
including its general structure, the different agents, core parameters and unique features in 
comparison with similar model approaches. In section 3 we discuss the environmental 
extension, policy scenarios and performance indicators used. Section 4 presents the simulation 
results and interpretations of these. Section 5 concludes. 
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2. The basic macro-evolutionary multi-agent model 
The model we present encompasses a full macro-economy that evolves from bottom-up 
according to agent-based methodology (Tesfatsion and Judd, 2006; Gilbert, 2007), building 
upon the framework presented in Rengs and Wäckerle (2014). Its computational simulation 
follows a stock-flow structure that is consistent with the so-called balance sheet approach 
(Godley and Lavoie, 2012). It includes the following sectors: households, firms, banks, central 
bank and government. All sectors are disaggregated, except central bank and government, in 
the sense that they are composed of a multitude of agents and their interactive dynamic 
relations. Our model is close in spirit to recent models by Cincotti et al. (2010), Delli Gatti et al. 
(2011), Riccetti et al. (2013) and Chen et al. (2014). Moreover, in terms of scale and scope it is 
roughly comparable with the models by Seppecher (2012) with a focus on labor markets, Dosi 
et al. (2013) emphasizing capital goods, banking and innovation, and Lengnick (2013) with a 
simplified general purpose model.  
Our model differs from these other approaches in a number of ways, notably distinct 
ownership and consumer classes with unique behavioral features and a detailed financial 
sector. In addition, the model can generate emergence of specialization patterns of firms in 
terms of the needs and wants servicing goods. In other words, a firm can for example initially 
produce goods that mainly serve basic needs, and over time shift to serving more want-related 
goods. This avoids the more common approach of starting with a fixed classification of firms or 
sectors with particular goods that permanently retain their character. Our approach is 
parsimonious (simplified) without sacrificing richness in explanatory power. 
The approach considers the economy as a complex evolving system that organizes itself 
endogenously. This is reflected by notions like non-equilibrium dynamics, (in)stability, systemic 
risk and vulnerability. The recent financial crisis has once more shown that these are central to 
understanding crucial macroeconomic issues. To add realism to the model, economic agents 
are described as being heterogeneous and boundedly rational, where we follow the heuristic 
and algorithmic concept of satisficing decision rules and adaptive behavior (Simon, 1987; 
March, 1991; and Winter, 2000). Next, we treat the government, the central bank, markets 
and organizations (firms, banks) as formal institutions and social norms as informal 
institutions. The latter are described as dependent on agent networks and their dynamics. This 
steers consumption behavior taking the form of imitation (bandwagon effects) and status 
seeking behavior by different consumer classes. In the case of status seeking behavior, we 
consider Veblen effects (conspicuous consumption) and snob effects; both with a focus on 
luxury goods, where the first is about high-price and the second about rare goods. Because of 
the population structure of the different agent groups (especially consumers and firms) the 
model can generate so-called co-evolutionary institutional change (van den Bergh and Stagl, 
2003; Hodgson, 2006; Dopfer and Potts, 2008; Wäckerle, 2014).  
In what follows we introduce the various types of agents in the model, which include 
households, firms, the banking system (commercial and central bank), and the government. 
Figure 1 provides an idea of the main structure of the model, focusing on monetary flows in 
the economy. 
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Figure 1: Monetary flows of the artificial economy 
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Households 
Households don’t optimize their consumption behavior, but are instead assumed to be rather 
loyal or rigid in their choice of vendors, while also being open to new opportunities that arise. 
Their decisions (namely, which firms’ products to buy) are linked to two differently 
motivational aspirations: need and want consumption. The tendency to buy from a specific 
firm then depends on the respective aspiration, the current product’s relative price and firm 
reputation. The latter two are based on well-documented consumer behaviors: bandwagon, 
Veblen and snob effects. The consumption decision differs with respect to social class; 
capitalist households and wealthy workers have a higher saving rate than workers.  
Households choose their seller in a boundedly rational way, by having a short list of preferred 
“vendors” at any given time (following Lengnick, 2013). They try to buy equal amounts from 
each firm on their list, as firms’ stock and household budgets permit. Households actually 
employ two lists, one for needs and one for wants. Initially, each of these lists consists of n 
randomly chosen firms.  During the simulation, households change the composition of these 
lists based on their preferences, slowly improving them in each round. As preferences are 
assumed to be different for needs and wants, these two lists will tend to comprise different 
firms. In the case of need consumption, households replace a firm that did not deliver – 
because of insufficient production or inventory – by another, randomly chosen one. In the 
want case, households do not immediately replace a firm that could not deliver, as it indicates 
a highly sought after good. Instead, they wait up to three months before randomly choosing a 
new one. 
If a seller (firm) is considered for potential replacement and is perceived to be better (by some 
small but noticeable degree) in terms of price and firm reputation (implying a utility premium 
for a household consuming its good) than the one selected for potential elimination from the 
list, the replacement is effectuated. The rules employed in this comparison partially depend on 
prices and firm reputation (market shares), following the dynamics of imitation and status-
seeking behavior (conspicuous consumption à la Veblen, 1899). In this respect we follow on 
the one hand Veblen’s general suggestion of trickle-down effects in social structure (Trigg, 
2001) due to working class consumers imitating capitalist class consumers. And on the other 
hand we are inspired by Leibenstein (1950), who specified consumption dynamics as 
resembling a bandwagon effect (imitation of other consumers) and contrasted it to the status-
seeking Veblen effect (luxury consumption) and snob effect (consumption striving for rare 
goods – “exclusiveness”). We model Veblenian consumer dynamics in a similar manner as 
Kapeller and Schütz (2014), but with substantially more details about the differences in 
quantity and price effects as well as about underlyin g population dynamics. 
It is worthwhile to cite Leibenstein (1950, p.205) in this context:  “Any real market for 
semidurable or durable goods will most likely contain consumers that are subject to one or a 
combination of the effects discussed heretofore.”. Leibenstein concludes that there are four 
possible combinations dependent on price (normal price and Veblen effect) and firm 
reputation (bandwagon and snob effect). We extend his framework with need and want 
aspirations as well as social structure. This leads us to the following combinations of aspiration 
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(want and need) and social structure (workers, wealthy workers, capitalists). This is illustrated 
in Table 1. 
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Table 1: Types of consumer behavior and classes represented in the model; characterized in 
terms of good and price impacts on consumers 
The incorporation of the consumers as depicted in the table means that household 
consumption behavior is highly heterogeneous and dependent on social class. Changes within 
social class identification are endogenously possible (capitalist may go bankrupt with their 
firm, wealthy workers may found a firm, etc.), but it cannot appear abruptly; meaning in 
particular that if there is a change in social class it happens with a lagged duration (set at three 
months).   
Workers, wealthy workers, capitalists have different preferences and behaviors. Workers’ 
need consumption has a high normal price effect (indicating a strong preference for the cheap 
over the expensive) and a low bandwagon effect. Workers imitate the behavior of all need 
consumers. Worker want aspirations have a low normal price effect (indicating a weak 
preference for the cheap over the expensive) and a high bandwagon effect (they imitate the 
capitalist want aspirations). Whereas wealthy workers follow the same bandwagon, they 
further consume on behalf of a weak Veblen effect (weakly prefer the expensive over the 
cheap). Finally capitalist (firm and bank owners) needs are triggered by an average snob effect 
(searching for rare goods – inverted imitation) and an average normal price effect. Capitalist 
wants work with the same bandwagon but additionally with an average Veblen effect (they 
prefer the expensive over the cheap). 
Consumption behavior is thus not static but a co-evolving process between behaviors of 
consumers and social structure; i.e. a dynamic interplay between individual aspirations 
(need/want), status-seeking behavior, wealth and imitation dependent on emergent social 
structure driven by interactive evolution of populations of different classes of consumers.  
worker 
needs 
worker     
wants 
wealthy 
worker wants 
 capitalist 
wants 
capitalist 
needs 
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Firms 
A second group of agents are firms, which produce final goods using inputs of capital and 
labor. They employ a firm-specific production technology, with respect total factor productivity 
and emissions per output unit being heterogeneous among firms. Firms start with a number of 
differently scheduled credits (each with their own duration) emulating the reinvestment 
necessary to uphold the constant capital level to counter depreciation. They can apply for 
loans at banks operating in a credit market to increase or maintain production capacity. 
Goods-producing firms acquire capital from a single firm that produces capital goods. Physical 
capital is complementary to the production factor of labor. The capital goods firm is owned (as 
a crude proxy) equally by all households, who receive profit shares in relation to their wealth. 
Every month, a full production cycle up to delivery to final demand is achieved.  
The initial firm population starts with randomly (using a uniform probability distribution) 
assigned workers, resulting in slightly heterogeneous firms in terms of numbers of workers. 
These are then assigned a matching physical capital stock, in accordance with labor 
productivity and start with homogenous production technology.  
Every round each firm adjusts its production by monitoring the level of goods left in the 
inventory after sales. If sales exceed expectations, i.e. the inventory contains less than the 
targeted reserve stock (Godley and Lavoie, 2012), the firm decides to increase its output. The 
reserve stock is calculated by multiplying the firm’s sales in the previous period by the 
production reserve stock rate. Unsold stock depreciates over time since “old” goods are more 
difficult to sell over time. Prices are adjusted analogously to production, i.e. in relation to the 
level of under- or overestimation of sales. They are changed by small amounts and never fall 
below the estimated marginal cost per unit of output plus some mark-up. If the planned 
production requires more physical capital than available, the firm tries to get a loan to buy the 
additional machinery. Otherwise the firm maintains its current capital stock, since it cannot 
reduce it actively in this model, as opposed to the input of labor, which can be adjusted by 
hiring or firing workers, although with some delay (an interpretation of this could be 
protection by labor laws; cf. Seppecher, 2012). Physical capital depreciates annually so that the 
firm will need to reinvest if it desires to maintain the current level of physical capital. The 
profits of the firm accumulate in its current account over a whole fiscal year (12 months). At 
the end of the year funds are set aside for research and development (R&D) investments and 
corporate taxes are applied to the remaining amount. The rest is transferred to the firm 
owners. Firms adapt the wage based on the average increase of prices. 
Firms make their investment decision based on their estimated profit rate, defined as the ratio 
between profit and physical capital. The estimated profit of the firm is given by expected 
revenues minus current wages, interest payments, fixed credit repayments and expected 
additional credit costs. If their estimated profit rate exceeds the interest rate of their bank, the 
bank will guarantee a loan with a fixed duration and a fixed interest rate. Moreover, banks 
only grant additional credit if the sum of unrepaid credit of that firm is smaller than the firm’s 
production capital. If the profit rate is too low or the credit exposure is too high, the specific 
firm has to reduce its production output as much as possible. Obviously, if the profits become 
too low the firm needs to fire workers and reduce capital inputs, which together will lead to 
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lower production output. In the process, firms may go bankrupt, in which case capitalist 
households owning the firm become unemployed.  
Every period one new firm can be founded by the wealthiest worker household with a low 
probability. On founding, the owner of the new firm endows the firm with an operating budget 
for the first quarter and invests in initial machinery. The former are fully financed out of the 
households budget, the latter is equally financed out of own budget and in form of firm 
credits. If the household does not have enough savings to finance its part of the investment, 
the bank grants it a form of private credit (overdraft on its account). This is used as a proxy for 
risky private investment, and results in private debt which the owner cannot transfer to the 
firm. Newly founded firms start with production and emission reduction technologies that 
represent the average technology of the current firm population. 
Banking system 
Next we consider commercial banks and the central bank, which serve various roles in the 
model. Banks keep current accounts for firms, the capital goods firm and households (allowing 
for deficits) and savings accounts for households. In addition, they grant firm loans. They pay 
and charge interest for these different financial services applying distinct rates, limited by 
central bank interest rates. Banks have to refinance themselves, by monitoring assets (loans) 
and liabilities (savings). If banks lack liquidity they request loans at the central bank. 
The central bank keeps current accounts for the government (including overdraft functionality) 
and banks, as well as deposit facilities for banks, involving the paying or charging of interest. 
Furthermore it acts as a lender of last resort, but for the presented simulation experiments it 
does not accommodate any monetary policies.   
Government 
The government serves various roles in the model. It makes transfers to unemployed and 
retired households, and collects taxes on labor, income and capital gains, corporate profits 
made by banks and firms and the capital good firm, and value-added of sales. The government 
budget in the model is never perfectly in balance because of uncertainty about both tax 
revenues and government expenditures – as is the case in reality. As unemployment benefits 
and pensions are downward rigid, the government has no means to cut costs and has to deficit 
spend if necessary. If indebted, it pays interest to banks and households (in relation to their 
wealth) as a proxy for government bonds. 
  
3. Environmental extension of the model 
The environmental extension of the previously described ABM involves modeling CO2 
emissions of the processes of firms producing goods, and policies to curb these emissions as 
well as stimulate relevant environmental innovations and achieve neutral or positive 
employment effects.  
Firms emit CO2 over the course of their production process depending on the employed 
emission reduction technology. Half of the initial firm population starts with slight emission 
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reduction technology and the other half starts without emission reduction. The emissions per 
output (carbon intensity as a measure of pollutiveness) can alter over time through “green or 
environmental innovation”. Investment in R&D leading to innovation is assumed to have an 
immediate effect either on carbon intensity of the respective firm’s output or on total factor 
productivity. In other words, innovation is an individual process with a small role given to 
spillovers, a side effect of R&D. Since there are two different technology branches (emission 
reduction vs. total factor productivity), both may benefit from spillovers.  The highest spillover 
effect will occur if all firms perform research on the same technology branch, and achieving a 
much higher improvement in technology than without spillovers. Spillover effects depend on 
the sum of R&D investments in that branch. 
This represents the idea that knowledge creation regarding energy efficiency is relatively easily 
shared or transferred between sectors. This environmental extension allows us to test effects 
and consequences of pure climate policy (like a carbon tax) and a policy mix that can generate 
positive labor effects and contribute to climate goals.  
Our model does not account for climate change and its feedback to the economy, causing 
economic costs in terms of lost production (agriculture), damage to infrastructure and 
buildings due to extreme climate events, increased resource scarcity (water), health effects, 
etc. its Studying this is the focus of the long-term climate-economy models like DICE, FUND 
and PAGE. Our approach is closer to the climate policy assessment models, often using a 
general equilibrium format (Jorgenson et al., 2008; Naqvi, 2014).  
Household consumption behavior 
Climate policies generally will raise prices for both more and less carbon-intensive goods and 
services. While these are subject to normal demand responses (less demand for higher price), 
higher prices of goods produced by processes with a lower carbon intensity (“greener goods”) 
may in the short run attract conspicuous consumers. These then act in accordance with the 
Veblen (wealthy consumers looking for expensive goods that provide status) or snob effect 
(capitalists that look for rare goods; some “green goods” may become rare because of a very 
high price). All other consumer classes will slowly, in the medium run, imitate these richer 
classes (bandwagon effect).  
Emission reduction and adoption of greener technologies by firms 
As indicated, firms can improve either through total general (“non-green/non-environmental”) 
factor productivity (i.e. a technological progress scale parameter in the production function) or 
via green innovation (affecting the carbon emissions per output). These two options are 
exclusive, with the firm decision about which type of R&D to invest in depending on past 
performance (profits). Basically this decision heuristic relies on a simple profit comparison 
among a chosen subset of firms. Firms consider a number of their competitors (randomly 
chosen) and compare the profit-rate of these firms at the end of a fiscal year. If one of the 
innovation strategies has delivered higher profit-rates for a greater number of competitors 
than the other one, then this strategy is decided upon for the observing firm in the next year, 
independent of the previous strategy. If the situation is indecisive, then the firm sticks to its 
former strategy. As all firms observe the technology chosen by their competitors in the past 
year, firms can also imitate a strategy that the observed firms themselves no longer follow. 
Generally firms engage in research and development only if there is enough money left within 
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the firm or if the firm is profitable enough to get a credit from the bank. The costs of R&D are 
the same for both strategies (general and green innovation), defined as a fixed fraction of the 
firm’s current production capital. Innovation takes the form of upgrades of machinery, which is 
bought at the end of the year and is effective immediately at the beginning of the new fiscal 
year (bought from the capital goods firm). The cost is financed partly by profits and partly by 
loans, should profits not suffice to cover the costs. This reflects the reality that some (notably 
large, established or successful) firms finance their innovation completely out of profits, while 
others (notably starters) fully depend for this on loans, while a third category will combine the 
two funding sources. 
The cost of innovation is based on a constant relation to capital stock. To simulate the 
increasing technical difficulties and costs of reducing emissions per output unit, we assume 
that consecutive reduction of emissions gets less effective in a non-linear way. That is, the 
more effective the emission reduction technology that a firm currently employs already is, the 
smaller the next improvement from its R&D efforts will be. This is in line with the widely 
accepted assumption in economic analysis of environmental policy that marginal abatement 
costs are rising in the level of abatement. Arguably, this depends on assuming rational 
behavior, at least cost-minimizing or ranking of costs-effective abatement options. 
Furthermore all R&D efforts are subject to early mover advantages for both R&D branches. 
Government: carbon tax, environmental tax revision, producer and consumer subsidies, and 
green procurement  
To stimulate reduction of emissions by firms, the government can implement a price incentive 
via carbon taxes. The total revenues of these are the product of emitted units of carbon times 
the per unit carbon tax. These revenues accumulate in a “carbon tax fund” during the fiscal 
year, which is used to fund a number of policy instruments that are carried out in the following 
fiscal year, which will be described in a later section.  The above mentioned carbon tax gains 
are however assumed to be dedicated to finance the indicated climate policy instruments 
exclusively, thus the overall balance of the government has no influence on these policies. To 
execute some of these policies, the government offers subsidies either to households or to 
firms if they take specific actions. As the government has to announce the amount of the 
subsidy before households and firms take decisions (as they will base their decision on the 
extent of the subsidy), it does not know how many subsidies will actually be requested every 
month. As the government has to take the number of subsidies as given, it has to vary the 
amount that it will pay per subsidy on a monthly basis. To do so it bases the estimate for this 
period’s (a month) number of requested subsidies on the number of subsidies paid in the 
previous period. This may cause a cyclical movement of budget deficits and surpluses (i.e. 
under/overshooting the carbon tax fund) on a monthly basis but leads to a nearly balanced 
carbon tax fund budget on a yearly basis.  
The government can thus employ various policy instruments to either reinforce or 
complement the effect of the primary climate policy (carbon taxes), such as: directly support 
(subsidies) of green innovation, reducing labor taxes (creating employment), stimulating 
diffusion of less carbon-intensive products through (product subsidies to consumers), or even 
combining these instruments. Since the carbon taxes are collected in the first year of 
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simulation for the first time, the additional policy instruments are not applied until the second 
year. 
Governments can use the subsidy instrument as part of environmental policy. This takes the 
form of stimulating green inventions, innovations or market applications (adoption and 
diffusion) of environmental technologies, such as renewable energy or more energy-efficient 
technologies. Innovation subsidies are widely regarded as an instrument of technology policy 
that is complementary to carbon taxes, in the sense that both are needed to foster a transition 
to a low-carbon economy. The reason is that carbon taxes alone will select the most cost-
effective current technology (e.g., wind instead of solar PV, or a particular type of PV over 
another, even if it is uncertain whether this is the (environmental or economically) best 
technology in the long run. To keep a potentially attractive technological trajectory (e.g., solar 
PV) open, i.e. avoiding early lock-in, one can subsidize its R&D. Private companies typically 
underinvest in such R&D as returns on investment are too (s)low or uncertain, implying the 
need for public support. Formulating a policy package with carbon taxes and innovation 
subsidies will allow us to test to what degree these are complementary or substitutes in an 
evolutionary multi-agent context.  
Basically the government has two different options to foster a certain technological trajectory 
or even changing a technological paradigm, namely “supply-push” and “demand-pull” (Dosi, 
1982). The former strategy in our case aims to change technologies in a more sustainable 
direction by subsidizing “environmental innovation”. Firms then “push” the technological 
trajectory in a certain innovation direction, and demand is hoped to follow. The second option 
relates to the idea that technological change is largely driven (or “pulled” in a certain direction) 
by the demand side. This takes the form of the government providing product subsidies to 
lower consumer prices so as to stimulate the diffusion of less carbon-intensive products. Since 
in reality both supply-push and demand-pull mechanisms are continuously at work, in our 
model we include both mechanisms and associated policy instruments (where different 
scenarios will experiment with specific combinations of such instruments). 
 
Basic and policy scenarios 
The first step is to run the model without any policy setting in business-as-usual (Scenario 1), 
which serves as a reference scenario for assessing the various policy scenarios. A first policy 
scenario is aimed to test a carbon tax, i.e. a tax on CO2 emissions without employing any 
additional climate policies (Scenario 2). As the government has no means to reduce or increase 
its general spending (unemployment subsidies and pensions) willingly, these additional tax 
revenues have no effect on its behavior: 
• Research & development (Scenario 3): if a firm follows a green innovation trajectory, 
its R&D costs are subsidized. This can take the form of subsidies for the installation of 
green filters, for example. The total amount of R&D subsidies provided by the 
government will be approximately equal to the revenue of the carbon tax. Individual 
firms receive subsidies in relation to their R&D costs, weighted by the marginal 
effectivity of the improvement. Thus, if two firms have equal R&D costs (i.e. who have 
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the same production capital), the firm that will achieve a higher emission reduction by 
R&D will get a higher subsidy. 
• Labor tax reduction (Scenario 4): this is the much discussed idea of a shifting from 
labor taxes to carbon (CO2) taxes. This would alter the incentives for innovation from 
stimulating improvements in labor to carbon productivity, with potentially beneficial 
effects for environment and labor market.  
• Consumer product subsidy (Scenario 5): a subsidy to lower consumer prices for less 
carbon-intensive products, to stimulate their rapid diffusion. 
• Green procurement (Scenario 6): the government buys relatively much less carbon-
intensive (greener) products. This is operationalized by letting the government search 
randomly half of the population of firms producing relatively clean products, and 
sorting them according to carbon intensity. The lower the distance to the cleanest firm 
the more the government purchases (and it buys thus the most from the cleanest 
product). 
• All climate policy instruments actively used (Scenario 7): the carbon tax revenues are 
divided in equal parts among the different climate policy instruments at the end of 
each year. 
 
Simulation settings and performance indicators 
Simulations are run with 2000 households, 100 firms and five banks, one government and a 
central bank. Every simulated time step represents a full month. The time horizon of 
simulations is 25 year time span, therefore we look into annual aggregated data to compare 
the different policy scenarios. Additionally, we zoom in on a few performance measures and 
show the more fine-grained monthly dynamics as well. In general we look into annual 
simulated data for GDP growth, the unemployment rate, evolution of consumer price (in 
relation to the base year), emissions per GDP, the ratio of sold “wants goods” over sold “need 
goods”, the profit-rate of capitalists, the long-term capitalist wealth in relation to total wealth, 
and dynamics of production as well as of emission reduction technology. Annual data is 
derived as the average of monthly data over the year. Table 2 gives an overview about the 
main simulation parameters used for experiment. 
The model parameter which regulates the maximum credit exposure of firms was set to a 
fraction of firm’s capital. To this extent banks are acting rather carefully than greedy regarding 
the issuing of credits. As a consequence, newly founded firms can only grow slowly at best, 
whereas they could multiply their capital and output very fast if banks were assumed to be less 
risk-averted.  
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Table 2. Main simulation parameters 
Households 
Number of vendors on preferred lists 7 
Number of replacements per month 1 
Reserves of need consumption goods 1 month 
Savings rate worker households 0.1 
Savings rate wealthy worker households 0.15 
Savings rate capitalist households 0.2 
Initial savings endowment of worker households 𝛾𝛾1 ∗ 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎household 
𝛾𝛾1~𝑈𝑈(1,2)  
Initial savings endowment of capitalist households 10 ∗ (𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎) 
Firms 
Initial ratio capital (individual firm level) to wages (annual) 2 
Returns to scale (production function) 1 
Production reserve stock rate 0.1 
Unsold stock depreciation rate (monthly) 0.5 
Capital depreciation rate (annual) 0.1 
Firm founding probability (monthly) 1/18 
R&D costs as a fraction of capital 0.1 
Number of firms regarded during R&D imitation 5 
Maximum improvement of R&D efforts (w/o spillovers & FMA) 0.2 
Maximum spillover effect (based on achieved improvement) 0.5 
 
Banks 
Credit runtime 5 years 
Credit runtime for newly founded firms 15 years 
Credit interest rate (annual) 0.04 
Account interest rate (annual) 0.00125 
Account overdraft rate (private credit) 0.05 
Savings interest rate (annual) 0.015 
Central bank deposit interest rate (annual) 0.01 
Central bank loans interest rate (annual) 0.02 
  
Government 
Initial minimum wage 1000 
Initial unemployment subsidy 1000 
Minimum wage increase minimal interval 5 years 
Employment protection duration 2 months 
Value added tax rate 0.1 
Labor tax rate (flat for all worker households) 0.2 
Income tax rate (flat for all capitalist households) 0.2 
Capital gains tax rate 0.3 
Corporate tax rate (banks, firms, capital goods firm) 0.3 
Emission tax (in relation to average initial price) 0.1 
 
4. Results 
Simulation results are presented below in a format that allows direct comparison of the 
various scenarios formulated in the previous section. Basically we go stepwise through the 
central macroeconomic measures plus emissions and technology coefficients and compare the 
scenarios with BAU: GDP, unemployment, price inflation, carbon emissions, purchasing power, 
firm profit rates, wealth distribution, technology and emission reduction coefficient.  
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Figure 2 shows the annual development of real GDP. Real GDP is measured as the aggregated 
final demand by households and the government, adjusted by the weighted mean price for 
every year. At a first glance we see that the introduction of a carbon tax dampens GDP over 
the whole course of the simulation, in comparison to BAU. However, the collected revenues 
from this tax can bring back GDP to BAU once it is used for R&D subsidies (scenario 3). All 
other policy scenarios work as a demand shock for the economy and boost GDP up in contrast 
to BAU. In scenarios 4-7, even the initial value of GDP is significantly higher than BAU, since 
expectations of all actors are adjusted correspondingly from the start. The highest real GDP 
development is reached within scenario 4, i.e. the flat labor tax reduction on the household 
side that translates into higher purchasing power, a result that is confirmed by figure 6 later 
on.  
 
Figure 2: Real GDP under each policy scenario  
Figure 3 shows the monthly development of real GDP in comparison to figure 2 which shows 
annually aggregated data for the same simulation runs. As can be seen in both figures the 
artificial economy needs one or two years to stabilize into the long term trajectories, though it 
takes up to five years for scenarios of policies that cause strong increases in demand. The 
reason for the initial perturbations is that it is nearly impossible to create initial conditions that 
perfectly match the model’s endogenous dynamics. This is common with more complex ABM 
simulations, some even need a prolonged “warm-up” phase of simulation periods, compare 
e.g. Lengnick (2013). Furthermore, figure 3 indicates small seasonal effects within annual 
periods, which are a result of profit distributions and interest payments at the end of every 
fiscal year, which cause households’ behavior to change and requires firms to adapt. As figure 
3 shows, fluctuations within years are relatively small, revealing stable dynamics. Still, 
displaying monthly data reduces readability of the figure, without gaining additional insight. 
Thus, we will only show annual data in the following figures. 
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Figure 3: Real GDP under each policy scenario – (monthly data)  
In terms of unemployment we can immediately observe strong differences among the chosen 
scenarios. Figure 4 highlights that the unemployment rate has a bandwidth for fluctuations up 
to 4% among the scenarios. The carbon tax scenario 2 (CT) has the highest unemployment rate 
starting with 18% and developing till 24% after 25 years. This notion indicates that a carbon tax 
without any particular dedication for its revenues creates a significant problem for the labor 
market that needs to get addressed. The tax makes the price of carbon-intensive products 
more expensive and aggregate demand is shocked by this policy, translating into lower 
production as we have seen in figure 1. In our case all scenarios 3-7 with a combined policy 
perform even better than BAU, a surprising result in face of the diversity of economic channels 
we have addressed with them. The best performing scenario in terms of employment (lowest 
unemployment) is given in scenario 4 (L), using all carbon tax revenues to reduce labor taxes. 
This is what one might expect, but it should be noticed that the difference with 5-7 are not 
that huge. The latter three are performing quite similarly in terms of unemployment, which is 
intuitive as they all contribute to stimulating diffusion, whether through private or public 
consumption, or both. Finally scenario 3 (R&D) performs very well in terms of unemployment, 
more than we have expected. In the first 10-15 years of simulation the unemployment rate is 
quite close to BAU, but then the R&D subsidies pay off and the scenario catches up with 5-7. 
Still, scenario 7 (ALL) does not stand out that much. The reason is that (equally) distributing 
carbon tax revenues over all mentioned complementary instruments dilutes the impacts of 
each compared to their effect in policy scenarios were all revenues are spent on a single 
instrument.  
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Figure 4: Unemployment rate under each policy scenario 
In figure 5, we are dealing with consumer price inflation, i.e. the composite weighted average 
price for all need and want sales on the market. In this figure we are showing the data in 
relation to the BAU scenario which then represents the base line. We have chosen this mode 
of visualization for figures 5, 6 and 9 to 12 to highlight the difference with the BAU scenario, 
without the figure being visually dominated by a common simulation trend of the respective 
indicator. Scenario 4 (L) deflates the consumer price significantly in comparison to BAU via the 
labor tax reduction. Where scenario 3 (R&D) shows the same behavior in the first 15 years, 
consumer prices recover afterwards slightly below BAU. The highest inflationary dynamics (still 
just 6% higher than BAU after 25 years) are given by scenarios 5 (C) and 6 (GP). This effect 
results from the demand shock driven by either direct consumer price subsidies or via 
government activity enhancing green procurement. 
 
Figure 5: Weighted consumer price level under each policy scenario (price inflation relative to 
BAU) 
Figure 6 shows the development of the stock of carbon emissions in relation to BAU for all 
given scenarios. The results are somewhat surprising. The only scenarios that are pushing 
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carbon emissions down are given by the simple introduction of a carbon tax – scenario 1 (CT) – 
and the double dividend policy with R&D subsidies – scenario 3 (R&D). All other policies 
perform even worse than BAU. By far the dirtiest scenario in comparison to BAU is indicated by 
the labor tax reduction – scenario 4 (L). An explanation for this case needs to compare the 
growth effect on GDP driven by higher purchasing power in scenario 4 that outperforms the 
market selection on less carbon-intensive products. This aspect is again connected, as already 
mentioned, to the lending behavior of firms in our model. Since we do not allow for too risky 
lending, green firm selection does no out-compete the general growth effect. 
 
Figure 6: Stock of carbon emissions under each policy scenario (relative to BAU) 
Figure 6 shows that scenarios 2 (CT) and 3 (R&D) lead to a lower carbon stock level than BAU, 
while scenario 3 ends at the lowest level. However figure 7 represents the development of 
absolute carbon stocks and indicates the corridor of emission reduction we are dealing with in 
the simulation. 
 
Figure 7: Stock of carbon emissions under each policy scenario 
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Figure 8 substantiates the aforementioned results with a closer look on market dynamics. It 
shows the development of the annual shares between need and want sales. Basically in our 
model this measure serves as an indicator for purchasing power, the higher the relative 
income/wealth the higher the want sales that are boosting the economy. Of course as we have 
already seen – especially within scenario 4 (L) and 5 (C) – this has a significant impact on the 
stock of carbon emissions if market selection does not steer in direction of less carbon-
intensive products. Obviously the high-price firms have not significantly shifted to low-carbon 
intensive products. We have expected that this pulling of consumers of the higher social 
classes with Veblen and snob effects drives the economy on a low-carbon path. This is not an 
obvious case in this picture now, which can get explained through this particular market 
selection. Generally, a mere introduction of a carbon tax does influence purchasing power 
quite direct, shifting it below the BAU case. 
 
Figure 8: Want/need ratio of sales under each policy scenario 
Figure 9 shows the development of firm profit rates in comparison to BAU. Obviously all 
scenarios 2-7 translate into lower firm profit due to the introduction of the carbon tax. 
Scenario 3 (R&D) keeps up with the higher costs at best due to the subsidies for further 
technological investment in emission reduction. All other scenarios – instead of scenario 4 (L) – 
catch up after 25 years of simulation.  
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Figure 9: Profit rates of firms (relative to BAU) under each policy scenario  
Figure 9 shows the direct impact of losses in firm profit for the capitalist class thereafter. Since 
firm owners are not able to transfer bigger shares as dividends, the development of their 
wealth decreases significantly in comparison to BAU. In scenario 4 (l) capitalist wealth 
decreases even more than with a pure introduction of a carbon tax – scenario 1 (CT). All other 
demand-driven scenarios of the double-dividend policy program lead to higher capitalist 
wealth as the simple carbon tax but significantly lower than the supply-driven scenario 3 
(R&D). In this regard all scenarios redistribute wealth within households from the capitalist 
class to the working class, but the demand-driven “pull” policies at most.  
 
Figure 10: Wealth of capitalists in relation to overall wealth (relative to BAU) under each policy 
scenario 
Finally we want to show the changes in the two technology branches (emission reduction vs. 
total factor productivity). Figure 11 visualizes the innovation in total factor productivity relative 
to the BAU case. Here scenario 3 (R&D) indicates a reduction in innovative activity for total 
factor productivity (TFP). Scenario 4 (L) and 5 (C) do not shift adequately away from BAU in 
terms of TFP. These two scenarios increase household’s purchasing power, but the market 
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selection for less carbon-intensive products is not strong enough. Surprisingly, scenario 6 (GP), 
shifts away from TFP innovation in the first 15 years. 
 
Figure 11: Technological change – total factor productivity (relative to BAU) under each policy 
scenario  
Figure 12 shows the development of emission reduction and its diffusion over time. It is 
worthwhile to note that figure 12 does not simply represent an inverse of figure 11, but offers 
additional results, because firms do have the option not to innovate as well. Scenarios 2 (CT), 4 
(L) and 5 (C) shifts the economy towards higher relative carbon intensity relative to BAU. The 
demand-pull strategy has favorable macro impacts for GDP growth and unemployment, but 
this picture changes when we are concerned with technological innovation. Here the supply-
push scenario 3 (R&D) performs best, the subsidy for R&D works and firms take the second 
technological branch as a serious option. This effect is still visible in the combination of all 
scenarios 7 (ALL), where we can see that a quarter of the money allocated to R&D subsidy for 
emission reduction leads roughly into a 5% lower emission reduction coefficient than single 
R&D, in comparison to BAU at the end of the simulation run. Otherwise green procurement – 
scenario 6 (GP) – does not select well enough for less carbon-intensive firms and we can see 
that it even supersedes BAU after 25 years. 
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Figure 12: Technological change – carbon intensity (relative to BAU) under each policy scenario  
 
5. Conclusions 
We developed a macro-evolutionary model of an artificial one-country closed economy to 
study a range of climate policies. The model accounts for a variety of observed behavioral 
features of consumers, such as imitation, status and snob effects. With the model we simulate 
2000 households, 100 (initial) firms, five commercial banks, one capital goods firm, one central 
bank and one central government. The model describes improvements in carbon intensity of 
production due to innovation and diffusion of associated greener products, under the 
influence of various policies. 
We examine a basic policy scenario with a carbon tax which generates revenues  (a “carbon 
fund”) that can be used to create and finance various additional instruments of a climate policy 
package: a shift from labor to carbon taxes, a direct consumer subsidy for greener (less carbon-
intensive) products, subsidizing green innovation, and green procurement (governmental 
spending on greener products). In addition, we consider a policy package consisting of a 
combination of consumer product subsidies and green procurement, and one comprising all 
the mentioned policy instruments. 
The results show that the scenarios generate similar trends for most variables but with 
different levels. The simulations show that GDP is quite constant with variations of 1%, 
meaning a stable economic development under all scenarios. The results for the 
unemployment rate show a wider bandwidth, namely up to 4%. The best scenario, having the 
lowest unemployment rate is shifting taxes from labor to carbon tax, while the worst is only 
implementing a carbon tax. Policy packages with carbon tax revenues used to support 
innovation, diffusion or both perform in between. Generally all simulation experiments are 
characterized by steadily rising unemployment, mainly because of the combination of 
technological progress and resulting increasing labor productivity with wages increasing slower 
than productivity.  As a consequence the government faces increasing cost of social welfare 
benefits to unemployed.  
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As expected, the policy package subsidizing R&D with the revenues from the carbon tax was 
the best to perform in terms of stock of carbon emissions. The second best policy package is 
CT or the carbon tax scenario, which simply taxes carbon emissions. Unfortunately, even if it 
showed a good performance in reducing unemployment, the policy package shifting carbon 
revenues to labor tax reduction does not perform well in terms of carbon emission stocks. 
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Appendix 
Monthly Simulation Phases 
Founding phase 
Households evaluate and initiate firm founding 
Production phase 
Firms demand estimation and pricing 
Firms credit adjustment and production 
Firms adapt prices 
Sales and consumption phase 
Government purchases products with low carbon intensity 
Government calculates consumption subsidy base pre consumption 
Households check financial status 
Households decide consumption budget 
Households buy need goods 
Households (capitalists) buy want goods 
Households (workers) buy want goods 
Households update need vendor lists 
Households update want vendor lists 
Households balance accounts with savings if indebted or declare bankruptcy 
Wages payment phase 
Firms pay wages 
Government pays pensions 
Government pays unemployment subsidies 
Saving phase 
 Households transfer money to savings accounts 
Interest and consolidation phase 
Banks collect credit interest 
Banks collect credit repayments 
Banks calculate accounts interest 
Banks calculate savings interest 
Banks pay central bank loans interest 
Banks pay central bank loans repayments 
Firms’ monthly accounting 
Banks verify firms’ solvency 
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Banks monthly accounting   
Banks calculate refinancing demands 
Banks refinance at central bank 
Banks transfer funds to facilities at central bank 
Central banks pay reserve interest 
Central banks pay deposit facilities interest 
Government refinancing phase 
Update macro indicators 
Banks monthly accounting 
Central banks monthly accounting 
Government monthly accounting 
Country updates macro indicators 
 
Annual Simulation Phases 
Annual accounting phase 
Banks collect and pay accounts interest 
Banks pay savings interest 
Firms calculate profits and pay taxes 
Banks calculate profits and pay taxes 
Firms distribute profits 
Banks distribute profits 
Capital goods firms distribute profits 
Government calculates annual emission tax redistribution funds 
Firms decide R&D activities 
Government update annual statistics (annual taxes) 
Country compile annual report 
Government check minimum wage increase 
Government increases unemployment subsidies if minimum wage increased 
Government evaluates pension increase based on CPI 
Firms evaluate wage increases based on CPI 
Capital goods firm adapts prices based on CPI 
Firms depreciate production capital 
Firms engage in R&D activities 
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